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Abstract
This paper analyzes the interactions between labor and housing (and land) markets in a city.
We develop a monocentric city model involving land development and frictional unemployment.
Unemployment, the spatial structure of a city, land development, housing demand, prices of
housing and land are all endogenously determined in the model. We then characterize two
different spatial configurations, spatial mismatch equilibrium in which unemployed workers are
located far from jobs and integrated equilibrium in which unemployed workers live in areas close
to jobs. To better understand how two equilibria are affected by labor market parameters, such
as search intensity, wage, job finding rate, job destruction rate, and so on, we implement a
comparative steady state analysis. We further explored the effects of policies such as a tax on
land development to subsidize residents, a subsidy to reduce residents’ commuting costs, and a
subsidy to improve unemployed workers’ benefits.
JEL Classification: R14, R21, R28
Key words: Land development, City structure, Search frictions, Spatial mismatch
1 Introduction
It is commonly observed that the intensity of land development varies a lot between different areas
of modern cities: buildings close to a city center are usually taller than those in a city fringe. It is
also observed that the incidence of unemployment is unevenly distributed between different areas
within cities. In several U.S. large cities, the unemployment rates are higher in city centers than
∗We thank Marcus Berliant, Ping Wang, and Yves Zenou for their comments and suggestions. Of course, we are
responsible for any remaining errors. We acknowledge the financial support from RIETI, the Japan Society for the
Promotion of Science, through a Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B).
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in suburbs.1 In other countries, we also observe the variation of unemployment rate in different
areas within a city, although it becomes more complex.2 For instance, in Japan, the three largest
metropolitan areas (MAs) exhibit different patterns:3 in the second largest city, Osaka MA, the
unemployment rate is higher in the city center than in suburbs (in 2005, it is 0.108 in the central city
and 0.068 in the suburb cities). In the third largest city, Nagoya MA, the opposite holds true (the
unemployment rate in 2005 is 0.055 in the central city and 0.044 in suburb cities). In the largest
city, Tokyo MA, we observe no systematic spatial difference in the unemployment rate (in 2005, it
is 0.056 in the central city and 0.056 in the suburb cities). As first shown by Wasmer and Zenou
[21] and further investigated by subsequent studies (see Zenou [26]), interactions between land and
labor markets can explain these spatial differences in the unemployment rate. They also proved
that such interactions result in market inefficiency, indicating possible positive roles of policies in
improving welfare of residents.
In this paper, we uncover effects of various policies on land use patterns and welfare by con-
structing a monocentric city model that involves unemployment and land use. To be more precise,
we consider a city where all jobs are located in the unique central business district (CBD). Em-
ployed workers and unemployed workers coexist in the city due to search frictions in the labor
market. Developers rent land from absentee landlords and supply housing service. Each worker
obtains utility from the numèraire and housing consumption while she/he needs to commute to
the CBD in order to work when employed and in order to search for a job when unemployed. By
comparing the maximum housing price that each type of workers is willing to pay at each location,
we obtain two types of equilibrium: spatial mismatch equilibrium in which unemployed workers
locate far away from the CBD and integrated equilibrium where unemployed workers are close to
the CBD. By using this framework, we analyze policy effects on land use/development and welfare
of residents in the two types of equilibrium. Here, we focus on the following three policies: (a) a
land development policy that taxes housing development in the city to subsidize residents, (b) a
transportation policy that improves the transportation infrastructure in the city, and (c) an income
transfer from employed workers to unemployed workers.
Our paper is related with long tradition of the literature of monocentric city models. This
1The discussion about this phenomenon can be found in the literature on spatial mismatch initiated by the seminal
work of Kain [10].
2Zenou [25] made a careful comparative review of the spatial distributions of unemployment in U.S. cities and
European cities.
3Here, we define the Japanese MAs as the Urban Employment Areas proposed by Kanemoto and Tokuoka [12].
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literature dates back at least to the classic monocentric city model by Alonso [1], Mills [14], and
Muth [15], which has become the standard framework to explain the observed regularities in the
real world cities, such as the variation of land development intensity and housing (land) price.
Brueckner [3] provides a unified treatment of these models, which is built around the key observation
that difference of commuting costs within an urban area is balanced by the difference of houisng
prices. It is shown that the model in Brueckner [3] does an excellent job of predicting the internal
structure of cities and explaining intercity differences of spatial structure. To account for the
observed pattern of higher-income groups locating more peripherally, Hartwick [6] and Wheaton
[23] extends the monocentric city model with homogeneous workers to incorporate multiple income
groups. When the income elasticity of land consumption exceeds the income elasticity of commuting
costs, households of greater income select locations near the city fringe as a compensation to land
consumption. Although these studies provided complete analysis of city structure under a perfectly
competitive labor market, unemployment was not introduced in them, implying that there is no
scope for welfare improving policies.
Given the prevailing spatial variations in labor market conditions, recent studies examined
interactions between the labor market and the housing (land) market. Wasmer and Zenou [21]
developed an urban search model by introducing a land market into the search-matching model.4
In their model, workers’ search efficiency is negatively affected by their distance to jobs. The
endogeneous location of workers in the city reflects the trade-off between commuting costs, land
rents, and the surplus associated with search. They show that there are two possible spatial
configurations in the city. The unemployed workers may be located close to the CBD or the city
fringe far away from jobs. Sato [18][19] considered the heterogeneity of workers in the background
of urban labor market. In all these models, the land and housing markets are not fully modelled:
they simply assumed that there is no land development in the city and each worker consumes fixed
units of land. Coulson et al. [4] explained the spatial mismatch by developing a search matching
model for a city with central and suburban labor markets. They assume that search is costly and
the costs of setting up a firm is higher in the central markets. These two key assumptions ensure
that unemployment rate is higher in the central area of a city than the suburban area. However,
the city structue is still exogeneously given in their model. Our model is the most closely related to
Smith and Zenou [20] and Xiao [24]. Smith and Zenou [20] extended the model described in Wasmer
and Zenou [21] by endogenizing the job search intensity and housing consumption whereas they
4A complete introduction of the search-matching framework can be found in Pissarides [16].
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treated land development exogenously, and Xiao [24] endogenized land development in the context
of a monocentric city with search frictions in the labor market whereas he assumed fixed housing
consumption.5 In contrast, we endogenized both demand and supply sides of the housing market
in order to examine the full relationship between housing and labor markets, which is indispensable
to policy analysis.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 proposes the model. Section 3 characterizes two
spatial configurations, spatial mismatch equilibrium and integrated equilibrium. Section 4 explains
the results of comparative steady state analysis that are usefull in understanding the policy effects.
Section 5 explores the performance of policies. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Spatial structure
We extend the basic framework of an urban search model developed by Smith and Zenou [20].
Consider a closed city where there is a continuum of workers of size one. Workers are either employed
or unemployed. An employed worker works and obtains wage income whereas an unemployed
worker seaches for a job. We follow Smith and Zenou [20] in assuming the city structure and
commuting behaviors of each type of workers: we consider a linear monocentric city, normalize the
land endowment at each location to one, and assume that land is owned by absentee landlords.
An employed worker commutes to the CBD to work and her/his commuting cost is tx, where t
is a positive constant and x is the distance from the CBD. An unemployed worker commutes to
the CBD to search for a position and get interviewed by firms posting vacancies. She/he bears
the commuting cost stx, where s ∈ (0, 1) represents the search intensity (such as frequency of job
interviews). Because our primary purpose is to analyze the housing development in the monocentric
city with job search, we simplify the framework of Smith and Zenou [20] by assuming that s is
exogenous whereas we endogenize the supply of housing service.
2.2 Developers
Housing service is supplied by developers, who rent land L from absentee landlords and combine
it with capital K to supply housing service. The production function of housing service is defined
as G(x) = LγK1−γ , where γ is a positive constant satisfying 0 < γ < 1. The housing service
5For the earlier studies relating the labor market to the land (housing) market, see Zenou [26].
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produced at location x can be written as g(x) = S1−γ in which S = K/L is the capital-land ratio.
A developer at location x, behaving as a price taker, determines the supply of housing service in
order to maximize its profit:
max
S
Π(x) = R(x)S1−γ − rS − φ(x),
where R(x), r, and φ(x) are the price of housing service at location x, the capital price, and the
land rent at x, respectively. We assume that the capital market is global and the city is sufficiently
small that the capital price is exogenously given.
The standard profit maximization yields the investment per acre of land and the supply of
housing service as6
S (x) =
∙
(1− γ)R(x)
r
¸1/γ
, (1)
g(x) =
∙
(1− γ)R(x)
r
¸(1−γ)/γ
. (2)
The constant returns to scale in housing service production imply that the equilibrium profit of
each developer is zero. From this zero profit condition, the bid rent, i.e., the maximum land rent
that a developer can pay, Φ(x), is determined by R(x)S (x)1−γ − rS (x)− Φ(x) = 0. Inserting (1)
into it, we obtain
Φ(x) = γ
µ
1− γ
r
¶(1−γ)/γ
R (x)1/γ . (3)
Because we assumed that landlords live outside of the city, land rents received by them can be seen
as a leakage of welfare in the city.
2.3 Workers
There are e employed workers and u unemployed workers, implying that e+u = 1. When employed,
each worker obtains the wage income w whereas she/he obtains b when unemployed. b represents
the income of self-employment or unemployment benefits. We assume that both w and b are
exogenous.
Workers obtain utility from consumption of housing service and the numéraire. We apply the
instantaneous utility function of the Cobb-Douglas form:
u = α lnh+ (1− α) ln z, (4)
where 0 < α < 1. h and z describe the levels of housing and numéraire consumption, respectively.
6Notice that the land endowment at each location x is normalized to one.
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2.4 Asset values and steady state conditions
Letting R(x) denote the price of housing service, the budget constraint of a worker is
I = z +R(x)h+ τx,
where I and τ are given by
I =
½
w if employed
b if unemployed
, τ =
½
t if employed
st if unemployed
.
Although our framework is dynamic, consumption levels are determined by instant utility maxi-
mization. Each worker, taking prices and g(x) as given, maximizes u with respect to z and h subject
to the above budget constraint. Utility maximization leads to the standard demand functions:
z = (1− α)(I − τx), h = α(I − τx)
R(x)
. (5)
The resulting indirect utility is given by
v(x) = B + ln(I − τx)− α lnR(x), (6)
where B ≡ ln £αα(1− α)1−α¤.
Time is continuous and we assume the off-the-job search. The opportunity of landing a job
for an unemployed worker arrive according to a Poisson process at an exogenous rate sλ (> 0).7
Each job is destroyed according to a Poisson process at an exogenous rate δ (> 0). Let W (x) and
U(x) denote the asset value of an employed worker residing at x and that of an unemployed worker
residing at x, respectively. W (x) and U(x) are given by
ρW (x) = v(x) + δ(Umax −W (x)), (7)
ρU(x) = v(x) + sλ(Wmax − U(x)).
where ρ is the exogenous discount rate. Umax and Wmax represent the results of workers’ maxi-
mization regarding location choice (i.w., Umax = maxx U(x) and Wmax = maxxW (x)). Equation
(7) implies that the flow capital cost of an employed or unemployed worker at location x is equal
to the instantaneous utility plus the utility derived from the change of her/his economic status.
We focus on the steady state. From the assumptions on the job matching and destruction
process, we have the steady state condition the job flows:
δe = sλu.
7λ can be endogenized in the same way as Smith and Zenou [20] without altering our main results.
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Combined with e+ u = 1, this yields
e =
sλ
δ + sλ , u =
δ
δ + sλ . (8)
It can be seen that an increase in job destruction rate δ reduces the number of employed workers
and raises the number of unemployed workers. For search effort s and job finding rate λ, they have
an opposite effect on e and u. An increase of s and λ leads to a larger e and a smaller u.
2.5 Bid rent functions and spatial structure
Workers can relocate costlessly within the city, which is a standard assumption in urban economics.8
This assumption implies that there is no incentive for workers to relocate in equilibrium. Therefore,
in equilibrium, all employed workers enjoy the same level of value (W (x) = Wmax = W ) and this
also holds true for unemployed workers (U(x) = Umax = U).
In order to determine the equilibrium location of workers, we use the concept of bid rents,
defined as the maximum price of housing service at location x that each type of worker is willing
to pay in order to reach her/his respective level of equilibrium utility (in this paper, asset value).
Plugging (6) into (7), the bid rents Ω of employed and unemployed worker can be expressed as
follows:
α lnΩw(x) = B + ln(w − tx) + δ(U −W )− ρW, (9)
α lnΩu(x) = B + ln(b− stx) + sλ(W − U)− ρU.
In order to see the location pattern in equilibrium, it is sufficient to examine the slope of the two
bid rent functions at the intersection of Ωw(x) and Ωu(x). Differentiating Ωw(x) and Ωu(x) and
evaluating them at Ωw(x) = Ωu(x) = Ω(x), we can see that
Ω0w(x) = −Ωw(x)α
t
w − tx, Ω
0
u(x) = −Ωu(x)α
st
b− stx,
which imply that Ω0w(x) < 0 and Ω0u(x) < 0. Therefore, we have two bid rent functions which are
downward sloping with respect to the distance from the CBD. We can see which is steeper than
the other at the intersection of the two bid rent functions:
sgn
£Ω0w(x)−Ω0u(x)¤¯¯Ωw(x)=Ωu(x)=Ω(x) = sgn [sw − b] .
From this, we have the following proposition:9
8For the effects of relocation costs in urban job search models, see Zenou [26] and Kawata [13].
9When sw = b, both employed and unemployed workers reside in mixed. Although we can characterize such
equilibrium, this case yields no interesting results.
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Proposition 1 Employed workers reside closer to the CBD than unemployed workers if sw < b.
The opposite holds true if sw > b.
The intuition of Proposition 1 is straightforward. Given wage and unemployment benefits, the
spatial structure of the city is determined by unemployed workers’ search effort s. If the unemployed
workers search less frequently, the commuting costs induced by search are lower. Then, employed
workers have stronger incentive to reduce commuting costs and propose higher bid rents for the
apartments close to the CBD than the unemployed workers. Therefore, the area near the CBD is
occupied by employed workers and the area near the edge of the city is allocated to unemployed
workers. However, if unemployed workers search more frequently, we then obtain a city with a
different structure in which unemployed workers reside in the area close to the jobs while employed
workers live far away from the CBD. Following the tradition in the urban job search models (see
Zenou [26]), we call the former spatial structure the spatial mismatch equilibrium and the latter
the integrated equilibrium.10 In both cases, the residential area is divided into two zones: in one
zone, only employed workers reside, and unemployed workers live in the other zone. We call the
former the employment zone (EZ) and the latter the unemployment zone (UZ).
In the following analysis, we focus on the two possibilities in Proposition 1.11
3 Equilibrium
As noted before, in equilibrium, all employed workers enjoy the same utility level W and all un-
employed workers enjoy the same utility levels U. Plugging Wmax = maxxW (x) = W , Umax =
maxx U(x) = U and (2) into (7), we obtain
ρW = B + ln(w − tx)− α lnR(x) + δ(U −W ), (10)
ρU = B + ln(b− stx)− α lnR(x) + sλ(W − U),
We have two different spatial configurations (i) spatial mismatch equilibrium and (ii) integrated
city equilibrium. We will deal with these two cases sequentially.
10The standard spatial mismatch hypothesis argues that the spatial disconnection between residential locations in
inner cities and suburban job opportunities account for the adverse labor market outcomes of low skilled minorities
(see the seminal work by Kain [10] and the empirical surveys by Jencks and Mayer [9], Holzer [7], Kain [11], Ihlanfeldt
and Sjoquist [8]).
11 If we endogenize the search intensity, much richer equilibrium configurations are possible. See Smith and Zenou
[20] for details.
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3.1 (i) Spatial mismatch equilibrium
We start from characterizing the spatial mismatch equilibrium (the case of sw < b). In this
equilibrium, the market housing price is determined by
R(x) =
½Ωw(x) for x ∈ (0, bx]
Ωu(x) for x ∈ (bx, x] , (11)
where bx is the intersection of Ωw(x) and Ωu(x). Hence, the market housing price at the center of
the city x = 0 is determined by the bid rent of an employed worker, and that at the edge of the
city x = x is determined by the bid rent of an unemployed worker. Here, we set the opportunity
cost of land use to one. Therefore, we have
R(0) = Ωw(0), R(x) = Ωu(x) = 1.
Substituting these equations and (11) into (10), we obtain
ρW = B + lnw − α lnΩw(0)− δ(W − U)
ρU = B + ln(b− stx) + sλ(W − U).
We can rewrite the bid rent functions (9) by using these asset values as
Ωw(x) = Ωw(0)
µ
w − tx
w
¶1/α
, Ωu(x) =
µ
b− stx
b− stx
¶1/α
. (12)
This shows that the bid rents of the employed and the unemployed workers are decreasing with the
distance to the CBD. Solving Ωw(x) = Ωu(x), we can see that bx is determined as
bx = w [(b− stx)Ωw(0)α − b]
t [(b− stx)Ωw(0)α − sw] . (13)
The remaining endogenous variables to be fixed are Ωw(0) and x, which are determined by
the population conditions. The population density d(x) at location x is described by the housing
supply over the housing demand g(x)/h(x). From (5) and (2), we obtain d(x) as
d(x) =
½ 1α ³1−γr ´(1−γ)/γ Ωw(0)1/γw−1/(αγ) (w − tx)1/(αγ)−1 for x ∈ (0, bx]
1
α
³
1−γ
r
´(1−γ)/γ
(b− stx)−1/(αγ) (b− stx)1/(αγ)−1 for x ∈ (bx, x] . (14)
We know that all employed workers reside in the employment zone (0, bx] and all unemployed workers
live in the unemployment zone (bx, x]. Therefore, the numbers of employed and unemployed workers
are described as
e =
Z x
0
d(x)dx, u =
Z x
x
d(x)dx (15)
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Substituting (13) and (14) into (15) and solving the two equations, we obtain Ωw(0) and x as
Ωw(0) = [1 + φt (su+ e)]γ , b− stx = sw
[1 + φt (su+ e)]αγ +
b− sw
[1 + φtsu]αγ , (16)
where φ = 1γ [r/ (1− γ)](1−γ)/γ .
3.2 (ii) Integrated equilibrium
In the integrated equilibrium (the case of sw > b), the market housing price is determined by
R(x) =
½Ωu(x) for x ∈ (0, bx]
Ωw(x) for x ∈ (bx, x] , (17)
where bx is again the intersection of Ωw(x) and Ωu(x). Hence, the market housing price at the
center of the city x = 0 is determined by the bid rent of an unemployed worker, and that at the
edge of the city x = x is determined by the bid rent of an employed worker:
R(0) = Ωu(0), R(x) = Ωw(x) = 1.
Similarly to the previous section, these equations and (10) lead to
ρW = B + ln(w − tx) + δ(U −W ), (18)
ρU = B + ln b− α lnΩu(0) + sλ(W − U).
By substituting (18) into (9), we obtain
Ωw(x) =
µ
w − tx
w − tx
¶1/α
, Ωu(x) = Ωu(0)
µ
b− stx
b
¶1/α
. (19)
Solving Ωw(x) = Ωu(x), it can be seen that bx is determined as
bx = b [(w − tx)Ωu(0)α − w]
t [s(w − tx)Ωu(0)α − b] . (20)
From (5) and (2), the population density d(x) at location x is determined by
d(x) =
½ 1α ³1−γr ´(1−γ)/γ Ωu(0)1/γb−1/(αγ)(b− stx)1/(αγ)−1 for x ∈ (0, bx]
1
α
³
1−γ
r
´(1−γ)/γ
(w − tx)−1/(αγ) (w − tx)1/(αγ)−1 for x ∈ (bx, x] . (21)
The location of two types of workers in the integrated equilibrium is opposite to that in the spatial
mismatch equilibrium. Using (21), the numbers of employed and unemployed workers are described
as
e =
Z x
x
d(x)dx, u =
Z x
0
d(x)dx.
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From these equations, we can see that Ωu(0) and x are determined by
Ωu(0) = [1 + φt(su+ e)]γ , w − tx = 1
s
½
b
[1 + φt(su+ e)]αγ +
sw − b
[1 + φte]αγ
¾
. (22)
The following proposition summarizes the above arguments:
Proposition 2 The equilibrium is characterized by a tuple (g(x),Φ (x) , R(x),Ωw(x),Ωu(x), bx, x,R(0), e, u):
the numbers of two types of workers (e, u) are determined by (8). In the spatial mismatch equi-
librium, R(0) = Ωw(0), and (16) determines (x,Ωw(0)). The bid rent functions (Ωw(x),Ωu(x))
and bx are given by (12) and (13), respectively, which determines the market housing price
R(x) as in (11). This , in turn, determines the development level g(x) and the market land
price Φ (x) as described in (2)and (3). In the integrated equilibrium, R(0) = Ωu(0), and (22)
determines (x,Ωw(0)). Equations (19) and (20) determines (Ωw(x),Ωu(x)) and bx, which,
combined with (17), (2), and (3), gives R(x), g(x), and Φ (x).
The two equilibrium city configurations are shown in Figure 1.
[Figure 1 around here]
4 Comparative Steady States
In this section, we explain the results of comparative steady states that help us understand the
policy effects. The goal of our analysis is to deduce the impacts of search intensity, wage, and
unemployment benefits on the spatial structure of the city (x and bx), housing prices (Ω0(x), Ωw(x),
and Ωu(x)), land prices (Φw(x) and Φu(x)), land development (gw(x) and gu(x)), employed and
unemployed workers’ lifetime utilities (W and U). These arguments are keys to understand the
policy analysis that will be given in the next section. The results of comparative steady states for
other parameters, t, δ, and λ, are given in Appendix.12 Our results are comparable to those shown
in Wheaton [22][23] and Brueckner [3].
4.1 An increase in the job search intensity
The results of comparative steady states regarding s are summarized in the following proposition.
12The proof of Proposition 3, 4 and A1 are given in a technical appendix that is available upon request.
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Proposition 3 The effects of changes in s are summarized as follows:
[Table 1 around here]
Henceforth, we use ‘+’ to represent a positive impact, ‘-’ a negative impact, ‘0’ no impact, and
‘?’ an ambiguous impact. Now let’s explain the impacts on all variables.
In the spatial mismatch equilibrium, the effects of an increase in the job search intensity s are
shown in Fig. 2.
[Fig. 2 around here]
When s increases, employment in the city increases, which intensifies the competition for housings
in the employment zone, EZ, and raises Ωw(x) for x ∈ (0, bx]. This can be confirmed in (16)
and (12). Facing a higher housing price, the profit-maximizing developers then provide more
housing. Therefore, land development in the EZ, gw(x), becomes larger. To produce more housing,
developers increase the input of land. Hence, the land price in the EZ, Φw(x), also becomes higher.
With an increase in land input, the threshold between EZ and UZ (the unemployment zone) moves
from bx to a more distant location from the CBD, bx0, and the employment zone gets larger from
EZ to EZ 0 in Fig. 2.
The impact of s in the UZ on housing prices, Ωu(x), land prices, Φu(x), and housing supplies,
gu(x), is ambiguous. Using (12), it can be shown that the housing price curve in the UZ moves up
and rotates in a clockwise direction with a rising s. The effect of s on Ωu(x) depends on its impact
on the size of the city, x. If x decreases with the increase of s, then housing prices, land prices,
and housing supplies increase in the area close to the EZ. In the area close to the edge of the city,
Ωu(x), Φu(x), and gu(x) decrease. However, if x becomes larger with an increase in s, then Ωu(x),
Φu(x), and gu(x) increase at each location in the UZ. In Fig. 2, we only show the case in which x
becomes smaller.
Although the comparative static analysis is complicated in the UZ, the intuition is simple. An
increase in s means that an unemployed worker increases the frequency of commuting to the CBD.
To save commuting costs, she/he prefers a closer location to the EZ. As a result, housing prices in
such locations are bid up, which in turn encourages developers to increase housing supplies there.
Land prices in these locations also become higher. In the locations close to the city fringe, an
12
unemployed worker would like to propose a higher bid rent if and only if the city becomes larger
and commuting costs become higher.
Now consider the impacts on lifetime utilities of employed workers and unemployed workers,
W and U . From (10), we can show that an increase in s reduces the instantaneous utility of
employed workers by increasing housing prices in the EZ. However, its effect on the expected loss
of becoming unemployed (U −W ) is ambiguous. The net effect on W is then ambiguous. For
unemployed workers, the effects of s on their instantaneous utility and the expect gain from being
employed in future are ambiguous. Hence, the net effect on U is ambiguous.
In the integrated equilibrium, with an increase in s, the housing price curve moves up and
rotates in a clockwise direction, which then leads to an ambiguous impact on Ωu(x), Φu(x), gu(x),
and bx. Intuitively, an increase in s raises the number of employed workers, which raises the demands
for housing in the EZ. Then Ωw(x), Φw(x), and gw(x) become larger. It can be shown that the
city becomes larger when s increases.
4.2 An increase in income
The next proposition summarizes the results of comparative steady states regarding w and b.
Proposition 4 The effects of changes in w and b are summarized as follows:
[Table 2 around here]
An increase in w
The effects of an increase in the wage rate w in the spatial mismatch equilibrium are described in
Fig. 3.
[Fig. 3 around here]
Using (16), it can be shown that an increase in w has no impact on the housing price at x = 0 and
leads to a larger x. Changes in the housing prices associated to a rise in w can be explained by
using (12): in the EZ, an increase in w makes the housing price curve rotate in a counterclockwise
direction around its intercept at the vertical axis. In the unemployment zone (UZ), it moves the
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housing price curve up and then rotates it in a clockwise direction. In the appendix, we show that
the threshold bx becomes larger as w increases. Intuitively, a higher wage raises the housing demands
of employed workers, which then increases housing prices in the EZ, Ωw(x). Facing higher housing
prices, developers would like to supply more housing to the market. To do so, they need to increase
the input of land and propose higher bids for land. Hence, both gw(x) and Φw(x) increase. The
EZ is also extended to EZ 0.
From (12), we see that w has no direct impact on housing prices in the UZ. However, it still
affects Ωu(x) indirectly through its effects on the size of the city. With a rising w, x becomes larger
and the city expands to x0. It implies that each commuting trip to the CBD becomes more expensive
for unemployed workers. To reduce expenditures on commuting, unemployed workers located in
the UZ prefer apartments close to the EZ. Therefore, they propose higher bids for apartments in
the area near the EZ. In the technical appendix, we show that an increase in w leads to an increase
in Ωu(x) at all locations in the UZ. On the supply side, as those in the EZ, developers increase
the housing supply gu(x) and raises their bids for land Φu(x).
The impacts of w on workers’ lifetime utilities, W and U, are ambiguous. An increase of w has
two opposite effects on W (U). On the one hand, a higher w leads to an increase (decrease) of
the employed (unemployed) workers’ instantaneous utility, which has a positive (negative) impact
on W (U). One the other hand, it increases the difference W − U, which is a loss (gain) for the
employed (unemployed) workers in future. As a result, if the job destruction rate δ is low, an
increase in w raises the employed workers’ lifetime utility W. If the job acquisition rate sλ is high,
an increase in w also raises the unemployed workers’ lifetime utility.
In the integrated equilibrium, a change in w doesn’t affect unemployed workers’ housing demand,
so Ωu(x), Φu(x), and gu(x) in the UZ are not affected. As a result, bx is unaltered. In the EZ,
housing prices Ωw(x) increases with a rising w. According to (2), (3) and (22), gw(x), Φw(x), and
x also increase. It can be shown that an increase in w also raises W and U.
An increase in b
In the spatial mismatch equilibrium, an increase in the unemployment benefit b has no impacts
on Ωw(x), gw(x), Φw(x), and x. This is because of our simple market, in which unemployment is
from search frictions and unemployment benefits have no impact on employment. In the UZ, an
increase in b rotates unemployed workers’ bid rent curve in a counterclockwise direction around the
intersection of two bid-rent curves. Hence, it raises Ωu(x), which in turn raises Φu(x), and gu(x).
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The city also becomes larger. As for U, an increase in b has a positive impact on an unemployed
worker’s instantaneous utility and a negative impact on her expected gain from being employed.
However, the net effect is always positive. Finally, although b has no impact on an employed
worker’s instantaneous utility, an increase of b still increases W by decreasing the expected loss
from the change of her economic status.
In the integrated equilibrium, the impact of b in the integrated city is similar to the impact of
w in the spatial mismatch equilibrium. Applying the same argument, we show that an increase
in b increases Ωu(x), Ωw(x), Φu(x), Φw(x), gu(x), gw(x), bx and x. The impacts on W and U are
ambiguous.
5 Policy issues
With the results of comparative steady states in hand, we move to the analysis of policy effects
on housing development and welfare in this economy. Here, we consider three policies: land de-
velopment tax, transportation policy, and income transfer. In so doing, we relate the performance
of each policy to the search intensity of unemployed workers. Because the model in the previous
section is already complex and becomes intractable once we introduce these policies, we resort to
numerical analysis in this section.
The values of parameters we use are as follows. The wage rate of employed workers is w = 30
and the value of leisure is b = 10. Therefore, we have a spatial mismatch equilibrium when s ≤ 1/3
and an integrated equilibrium when s > 1/3. The job finding rate is λ = 2/5 while the job
destruction rate is δ = 1/50. The discount rate is ρ = 0.05. Since the amount of non-land input
can be measured in any unit, we normalize r to 1. Commuting cost per unit of distance is t = 1/10.
The parameter in workers’ utility function is α = 0.15. In this paper, we set the search intensity
as s = 0.25(< 1/3) or s = 0.8(> 0.8). We can obtain the qualitatively same results under different
values of s.13 In Table 3, we summarize the two equilibira under these parameter values.
[Table 3 around here]
Note here that the unemployment rate is higher in the spatial mismatch equilibrium (16.7%) where
we set the search intensity as s = 0.25 than in the integrated equilibrium (5.9%) where we set the
13The results under different values of s are available upon request.
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search intensity as s = 0.8. This is consistent with the conventional image that cities with spatial
mismatch suffer from unemployment more than cities without it.
5.1 Land development tax
We first consider the effects of a land development tax. Consider a city government that collects
taxes from land development and redistributes them to consumers in a lump-sum fashion. The
main question is whether such development tax can possibly improve the welfare.
Denote by ηL the tax rate on housing development and by ζ the lump-sum transfer to a worker.
Then, the profit function of a developer at x becomes as
Π(x) = ¡1− ηL¢R(x)S1−γ − rS − φ(x).
By solving the profit maximization problem and using the housing production function, we obtain
the supply of housing as follows
g(x) =
∙
(1− γ)
r
¡
1− ηL¢R(x)¸(1−γ)/γ . (23)
By using the zero-profit condition, we obtain the following bid-rent function
Φ(x) = γ
µ
1− γ
r
¶(1−γ)/γ £¡
1− ηL¢R (x)¤1/γ . (24)
We can see that the development tax reduces the supply of housing service at each location x given
housing price R(x). However, as shown in the following analysis, the development tax also indirectly
affects housing supplies through its effects on housing prices. Assume that tax revenues are evenly
redistributed among residents by the city government. The lump-sum subsidy ζL is determined by
the city government’s budget constraint
ηL
Z x
0
R (x) g(x)dx = ζL.
With the lump sum transfer ζL, the budget constraints of the employed workers and the unemployed
workers are respectively given by
w + ζL = z +R (x)h+ tx,
b+ ζL = z +R (x)h+ stx.
Now we can derive the equilibrium under land development policy. As before, we have two
different equilibria. In the case of the spatial mismatch equilibrium, the housing prices at x = 0
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and x are given by
Ωw(0) =
h
1 + φ ¡1− ηL¢−(1−γ)/γ t (e+ su)iγ , (25)
b+ ζL − stx = s
¡
w + ζL¢h
1 + φ (1− ηL)−(1−γ)/γ t (su+ e)
iαγ + b− sw + (1− s) ζLh
1 + φ (1− ηL)−(1−γ)/γ tsu
iαγ .
Substituting (25) into (12), (11), (13) and replacing w by w + ζL and b by b + ζL, we obtain the
equilibrium solutions of Ωw (x) , Ωu (x) , R (x) , and bx when there is a land development policy. In
the integrated equilibrium, the housing price at x = 0 and x are equal to
Ωu(0) =
h
1 + φ ¡1− ηL¢−(1−γ)/γ t (e+ su)iγ , (26)
w + ζL − tx = 1
s
⎧
⎨
⎩
b+ ζLh
1 + φ (1− ηL)−(1−γ)/γ t (su+ e)
iαγ + sw − b− (1− s) ζLh
1 + φ (1− ηL)−(1−γ)/γ te
iαγ
⎫
⎬
⎭ .
Similarly, the equilibrium solutions of Ωw (x) , Ωu (x) , R (x) , and bx can be obtained by substituting
(26) into (19), (17), (20) and then replacing w by w + ζL and b by b+ ζL.
Using the parameters given above, we examine the effect of land development tax by evaluating
the derivatives of endogenous variables with respect to ζL at ζL = 0. If these derivatives are
positive, the land development tax affects endogenous variables positively. In Table 3, we report
the effects of land development tax on asset values (W , U , and SW ≡ eW + uU), total land rent
(TLR), land development (g(x)), and threshold locations (bx and x) for two values of job search
intensity, s.
[Table 4 around here]
The first and second columns show the effects of development tax on the spatial mismatch and
integrated equilibrium, respectively. The impacts of land development policy are complicated. On
the one hand, the subsidy ζL increases w and b. According to the results in Proposition 4, an
increase in w has ambiguous impacts on (resp. increases) W and U while an increase in b raises
(resp. has ambiguous impacts on) W and U in the spatial mismatch equilibrium (resp. in the
integrated equilibrium). On the other hand, the tax rate ηL has a direct influence on housing
prices, which affects workers’ utilities through changing their housing demands. As shown in Table
4, the land development policy raises W, U, and SW for both types of equilibrium.
Table 4 also shows the impacts on TLR received by landlords, or the leakage from urban welfare.
We found that the tax on land development reduces the leakage for all levels of s. In the spatial
17
mismatch equilibrium, on the one hand, according to Proposition 4, an increase in w leads to a
higher Ωw (x) and a higher Ωu (x) while an increase in b has no impact on Ωw (x) and positive
impacts Ωu (x). In the integrated equilibrium, the effects of w and b get reversed. By increasing
w or b, an increase in ηL raises land rents at all locations across the city. On the other hand, as
shown in (24), an increase in ηL reduce land rents directly. Our numerical analysis shows that the
negative effect of an increase in ηL dominates its positive effect for both types of equilibrium.
Let us now study housing supply g (x) expressed by (23). Our focus is on housing supplies in
the center of the EZ and the UZ. As in the analysis of the effect on TLR, an increase of ηL has
two opposite effects on housing supplies. The result of our numerical analysis indicates that in the
spatial mismatch equilibrium, the positive effect dominates the negative effect in the center of the
UZ while the latter dominates the former in the center of the EZ. The development tax encourages
land development in the suburbs whereas it discourages land development in the center of the city.
Put differently, land development tax makes the city spatially dispersed in the spatial mismatch
equilibrium. Unlike in the spatial mismatch equilibrium where the EZ is close to the CBD, it is
the UZ that is close to the CBD in the integrated equilibrium. In such a case, the marginal impact
of ηL on housing supply in the center of the UZ is negative while it is positive in the center of the
EZ.
The city dispersion is confirmed by the results regarding bx and x: the land development tax
encourages developers to develop more housings at locations far from the CBD and raises bx and x
for both types of equilibrium although the impacts on bx are much smaller than those on x.
5.2 Transportation policy
The second policy to be considered is to reduce the commuting costs in the city. Suppose that the
city government collects taxes ηT from each worker and use them as investment in transportation
infrastructure in order to improve the commuting traffic conditions. With the transportation policy,
the commuting cost per unit t is assumed to be reduced to t/(1+ ηT ). Then, an employed worker’s
budget constraint can be written as
w − ηT = z +R (x)h+ tx
1 + ηT ,
while an unemployed worker has the following budget constraint
b− ηT = z +R (x)h+ stx
1 + ηT .
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Replacing w by w − ηT , b by b − ηT , and t by t/(1 + ηT ) in the equilibrium conditions that
we have solved in Section 3, we then obtain the spatial mismatch equilibrium and the integrated
equilibrium under the transportation policy. Using the parameters given above, let’s show how the
investment to transportation infrastructure influences the equilibria.
The third and fourth columns of Table 4 report the results. Again, they can be explained
using the results of comparative steady states. Indeed, an increase in ηT reduces w, b, and t.
According to Proposition 4, a decrease in w has ambiguous impacts on (resp. decreases) W and U
while a decrease in b reduces (resp. has ambiguous impacts on) W and U in the spatial mismatch
equilibrium (resp. in the integrated equilibrium). As described in Appendix, a decrease in the
commuting cost, t, leads to a rise in W and U. The net effects on W , U , and SW are then
ambiguous. However, our numerical analysis shows that the positive effects dominate the negative
effects, and the transportation policy raises W , U , and SW for both types of equilibrium.
The transportation policy affects TLR through reducing workers’ income and commuting costs.
We have shown that a decrease in w (resp. b) reduces housing prices across the city in the spatial
mismatch equilibrium (resp. in the integrated equilibrium) while a decrease in b (resp. w) only
reduces housing prices in the UZ (resp. EZ) in the spatial mismatch equilibrium (resp. in the
integrated equilibrium). According to (3), land rents are affected in the same way. We have also
shown in Appendix that a decrease in t ambiguously affects housing prices and hence, TLR. As a
result, the net effects of ηT are ambiguous. Still, in our numerical analysis, ηT decreases TLR.
Similarly, ηT has ambiguous effects on housing supply g (x) . However, our numerical exercise
indicates that an investment in transportation infrastructure induces developers to supply less
housing.
Theoretically, the impacts of ηT on bx and x are also ambiguous. On the one hand, a decrease in w
(resp. b) decreases bx and x in the spatial mismatch equilibrium (resp. in the integrated equilibrium)
while a decrease in b (resp. w) only decreases x in the spatial mismatch equilibrium (resp. in the
integrated equilibrium). On the other hand, a decrease of commuting cost has ambiguous impacts
on bx and x. Hence, the net impact is not clear. However, the transportation policy increases bothbx and x in a similar way in the spatial mismatch equilibrium whereas it increases x more than bx
in the integrated equilibrium. This implies that the transportation policy enlarges EZ.
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5.3 Transfer to unemployed workers
We finally consider a policy that aims at subsidizing unemployed workers. Suppose that the subsidy
to unemployed workers is financed by taxes on employed workers. Denote by ηw the tax rate and
by ζw the subsidy rate. Then an employed worker’s budget constraint can be written as
w − ηw = z +R (x)h+ tx,
whereas an unemployed worker faces the following budget constraint
b+ ζw = z +R (x)h+ stx.
In equilibrium, the revenue of the city government is equal to its expenditure
ζw = eη
w
u
.
The model is exactly as before but we now replace w by w− ηw and b by b+ eηw/u. If ηw = 0, we
then goes back to the model introduced in Section 2. Now let’s analyze the impact of an increase
in s on the equilibrium outcomes when there is a transfer policy.
The effects on the spatial equilibrium outcomes are shown in the fifth and sixth columns. The
transfer from employed workers to unemployed workers reduces w and raises b. The comparative
steady states show that the net impacts onW and U are ambiguous. Here, we find that an increase
in ηw raises W, U, and SW . Similarly, the comparative steady states show that the net effect
of transfer on TLR is analytically ambiguous. However, our numerical analysis finds negligible
impacts of ηw on TLR in the spatial mismatch equilibrium and negative effects in the integrated
equilibrium.
Finally, let us analyze the impacts on the city structure. The transfer from employed workers
to unemployed workers reduces housing demands of employed workers and increases that of un-
employed workers. However, the housing supply is mostly unaffected. Hence, the EZ shrinks and
the UZ expands. This is represented by decreases in bx in the spatial mismatch equilibrium and by
increases in it in the integrated equilibrium.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper developed a monocentric city model with search frictions in a labor market and devel-
opment in a land market. Our model captures some important features in the real world cities:
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in equilibrium, we obtain two different spatial configurations, a segregated city and an integrated
city, which are roughly correspond to “old cities” and “new or edge cities” in the US (Wasmer and
Zenou [21]). We then explore the interactions between the labor market and the land (housing)
market. We also investigated how policies that are likely to improve welfare are associated to
land development and city structure. Analysis showed that the effects of policies on development
patterns and on land rents (welfare of landlords) can be quite different between the two spatial
configurations.
To better understand cities in the real world, some extensions of our model could be made. For
example, a detailed labor market structure with endogenous search frictions could be introduced
in the monocentric model. Another possible extension is to relax the assumption of monocentric
city and consider a city with a subcenter.
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Appendix: Full Results of Comparative Steady States
In this appendix, we explain the results of basic comparative steady states analysis regarding t,
δ, and λ. The goal of our analysis is to deduce the impacts of these parameters on the spatial
structure of the city (x and bx), housing prices (Ω0(x), Ωw(x), and Ωu(x)), land prices (Φw(x) and
Φu(x)), land development (gw(x) and gu(x)), employed and unemployed workers’ lifetime utilities
(W and U).
The next proposition summarizes the results of comparative steady states in the spatial mis-
match equilibrium and integrated equilibrium.
Proposition A1 The effects of changes in t, δ, and λ are summarized as follows:
W U Ωw(x) Ωu(x) R(0) Φw(x) Φu(x) x bx gw(x) gu(x)
spatial mismatch equilibrium
t - - ? ? + ? ? ? ? ? ?
δ ? ? - ? - - ? ? - - ?
λ ? ? + ? + + ? ? + + ?
integrated equilibrium
t - - ? ? + ? ? ? ? ? ?
δ ? ? - - - - - - + - -
λ ? ? + + + + + + - + +
Table A1. Comparative steady states regarding t, δ, and λ
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An increase in t
We start from the spatial mismatch equilibrium. In the EZ, an increase in the commuting cost t
affects housing prices Ωw(x) in two different ways. On the one hand, it intensifies the competition
for housing at x = 0, which then increases Ωw(0), the housing price in the CBD. According to (12),
an higher Ωw(0) moves the housing price curve in the EZ up. On the other hand, the housing
price curve rotates in a clockwise direction with a rising t. Therefore, the impact on Ωw(x) and bx is
ambiguous. However, we still can conclude that an increase in t at least raises the prices of housing
at locations near the CBD. In turn, housing supplies and land prices in this area also increase.
Intuitively, when t increases, the commuting trip becomes more expensive for employed workers.
To reduce their commuting costs, employed workers prefer to live close to the CBD. Therefore,
they propose higher bids for apartments in these locations. Housing supplies and land prices in
these locations also increase with a rising t. In the UZ, the bid rent curve of unemployed workers
also moves up and rotates in a clockwise direction with a rising t. Thus, the impacts on Ωu(x),
gu(x), and x are ambiguous. Concerning the utility level of workers, we show that an increase of
commuting costs always reduces W and U .
An increase in t in the integrated equilibrium has the same impacts as in the spatial mismatch
equilibrium.
An increase in δ and λ
Finally, take another two labor market parameters δ and λ. In the spatial mismatch equilibrium, an
increase in job destruction rate δ leads to a decrease of employment, which weakens the competition
for housing in the EZ and reduces housing prices Ωw(x). In turn, housing supplies, gw(x), land
prices, Φw(x), and the size of EZ, bx, also become smaller with a rising δ. From (16), we see that
the effect of δ on x is ambiguous. According to (19), (2), and (3), the effects of δ on housing prices,
housing supplies, and land prices in the UZ are also ambiguous due to the indeterminate change of
x. The impact of λ is just the opposite of the impact of δ. Both δ and λ have ambiguous impacts
on W and U .
In the integrated equilibrium, an increase in δ leads to a decrease in the total number of employed
workers and searchers, e+ su, which then reduces the housing price at x = 0. Using (19), (2) and
(3), we show that Ωu(x), Φu(x), and gu(x) decrease. An increase in the number of unemployed
workers increases the size of UZ, bx. According to (22), however, its impact on x is negative, which
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in turn decreases Ωw(x), Φw(x), and gw(x). As in the spatial mismatch equilibrium, the changes
following an increase of λ are just the reverse of the impacts of an increase in δ.
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W U Ωw(x) Ωu(x) R(0) Φw(x) Φu(x) x bx gw(x) gu(x)
spatial mismatch equilibrium
s ? ? + ? + + ? ? + + ?
integrated equilibrium
s ? ? + ? + + ? + ? + ?
Table 1. Comparative steady states regarding s
W U Ωw(x) Ωu(x) R(0) Φw(x) Φu(x) x bx gw(x) gu(x)
spatial mismatch equilibrium
w ? ? + + 0 + + + + + +
b + + 0 + 0 0 + + 0 0 +
integrated equilibrium
w + + + 0 0 + 0 + 0 + 0
b ? ? + + 0 + + + + + +
Table 2. Comparative steady states regarding w and b
spatial mismatch (s = 0.25) integrated (s = 0.8)
Asset value of employed (W ) 56.55 57.95
Asset value of unemployed (U) 50.12 55.14
Social welfare (SW ) 55.48 57.79
Unemployment rate (u) 0.167 0.059
Housing supply of EZ (gw(x)) 0.54 0.54
Housing supply of UZ (gu(x)) 0.50 0.59
Table 3. Comparison between the spatial mismatch equilibrium and integrated equilibrium
Notes: Housing supplies, gw(x) and gu(x) are evaluated at the centers of EZ and UZ, respectively.
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Technical Appendix (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
Yasuhiro Sato∗and Wei Xiao†
June 25, 2013
This appendix presents the proof of the results summarized in Proposition 3, 4 and A1. We
start from the spatial mismatch equilibrium.
1 The spatial mismatch equilibrium
1.1 Search intensity
Effect on bx and x
Using (16), we get
(b− stx)Ωw(0)α = sw + (b− sw)
µ
1 + φt (su+ e)
1 + φtsu
¶αγ
.
Plugging the above equation into (13) yields
bx = w
t
½
1−
∙
1 + φtsu
1 + φt (su+ e)
¸αγ¾
. (A1)
Let
Γ ≡ 1 + φtsu
1 + φt (su+ e) .
We then have bx = w
t
(1− Γαγ) .
Plugging e = sλδ+sλ and u =
δ
δ+sλ into the expression of Γ and differentiating it with respect to s
yields
∂Γ
∂s = −
φt δλ
(δ+sλ)2h
1 + φt s(δ+λ)δ+sλ
i2 < 0,
∗Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University, email: ysato@econ.osaka-u.ac.jp
†Corresponding author, Department of Economics, Stockholm University, email: wei.xiao@ne.su.se
which implies ∂x∂s > 0.
Let
Λ ≡ sw
[1 + φt (su+ e)]αγ +
b− sw
[1 + φtsu]αγ . (A2)
Differentiating (16) with respect to s yields
∂x
∂s = −
1
st
∙∂Λ
∂s + tx
¸
,
where
∂Λ
∂s = w
∙
1 + φts (δ + λ)δ + sλ
¸−αγ
− w
∙
1 + φt sδδ + sλ
¸−αγ
− αγφtδ
(δ + sλ)2
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
sw (δ + λ)h
1 + φts(δ+λ)δ+sλ
iαγ+1 + (b− sw) δh
1 + φt sδδ+sλ
iαγ+1
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
< w
⎧
⎨
⎩
1h
1 + φts(δ+λ)δ+sλ
iαγ − 1h
1 + φt sδδ+sλ
iαγ
⎫
⎬
⎭
< 0.
Therefore, the sign of ∂x∂s is indeterminate.
Effect on Ωw(x), Φw (x) and gw (x)
Using (16), it is easy to show that ∂Ωw(0)∂s > 0. Then differentiating (12) with respect to s
and using ∂Ωw(0)∂s > 0 in the result, we have
∂Ωw(x)
∂s > 0, which together with (2) and (3) implies
∂gw(x)
∂s > 0 and
∂Φw(x)
∂s > 0 for x ∈ (0, bx].
Effect on Ωu(x), Φu (x) and gu(x)
Differentiating (12) yields
∂Ωu(x)
∂s = −
tx
α (b− stx)
1
α−1 (b− stx)− 1α − 1α (b− stx)
1
α (b− stx)− 1α−1 ∂ (b− stx)∂s ,
where ∂(b−stx)∂s = ∂Λ∂s < 0. Therefore, the sign of
∂Ωu(x)
∂s is indeterminate. In turn, the impact of s
on Φu (x) and gu(x) is also ambiguous.
Effect on W and U
Plugging (12) into (10) yields
ρW = B + ρ+ δρ+ δ + sλ lnw −
α (ρ+ sλ)
ρ+ δ + sλ lnΩw(0) +
δ
ρ+ δ + sλ ln(b− stx), (A3)
ρU = B + sλρ+ δ + sλ lnw −
αsλ
ρ+ δ + sλ lnΩw(0) +
ρ+ δ
ρ+ δ + sλ ln(b− stx). (A4)
The sign of ∂W∂s and ∂U∂s is then indeterminate.
1.2 Wage
Effect on bx and x
Differentiating (A1) with respect to w, we obtain
∂bx
∂w =
1− Γαγ
t
> 0.
Differentiating (16) with respect to w yields
∂x
∂w = −
1
t
½
1
[1 + φt (su+ e)]αγ −
1
[1 + φtsu]αγ
¾
> 0.
Effect on Ωw(x), Φw (x) and gw (x)
Differentiating (12) with respect to w yields
∂Ωw(x)
∂w =
Ωw(0)
α
tx
w2
µ
w − tx
w
¶1/α−1
> 0.
We then have ∂Φw(x)∂w > 0 and
∂gw(x)
∂w > 0.
Effect Ωu(x), Φu (x) and gu(x)
Differentiating (12) with respect to w yields
∂Ωu(x)
∂w =
st
α (b− stx)
1/α (b− stx)− 1α−1 ∂x∂w,
where ∂x∂w > 0. We then have
∂Ωu(x)
∂w > 0. In turn, we have
∂Φu(x)
∂w > 0 and
∂gu(x)
∂w > 0.
Effect on W and U
Differentiating (A3) and (A4) yields
ρ∂W∂w =
ρ+ δ
ρ+ δ + sλ
1
w
+
δ
ρ+ δ + sλ
∂ (b− stx)
∂w ,
ρ∂U∂w =
sλ
ρ+ δ + sλ
1
w
+
ρ+ δ
ρ+ δ + sλ
∂ (b− stx)
∂w ,
where ∂(b−stx)∂w < 0. Therefore, the sign of
∂W
∂w and
∂U
∂w is then indeterminate.
1.3 Unemployment benefits
Effect on bx and x
From (A1), it can be seen that b has no impact on bx.
Differentiating (16) yields
∂x
∂b =
1
st
µ
1− ∂Λ∂b
¶
,
where
∂Λ
∂b =
1
(1 + φtsu)αγ < 1.
Therefore, we have ∂x∂b > 0.
Effect on Ωw(x), Φw (x) and gw (x)
From (12), we see that b has no impact on Ωw(x). Then it has no impact on Φw(x) and gw(x)
either.
Effect on Ωu(x), Φu (x) and gu(x)
Differentiating (12) yeilds
∂Ωu(x)
∂b =
1
α
µ
b− stx
b− stx
¶1/α−1 1
b− stx
∙
1− 1
(1 + φtsu)αγ
b− stx
b− stx
¸
>
1
α
µ
b− stx
b− stx
¶1/α−1 1
b− stx
∙
1− 1
(1 + φtsu)αγ
b− stbx
b− stx
¸
for x > bx. Plugging (A1) into the above inequality, we obtain ∂Ωu(x)∂b > 0. In turn, we have
∂Φw(x)
∂b > 0 and
∂gu(x)
∂b > 0.
Effect on W and U
Differentiating (A3) and (A4) yields
ρ∂W∂b =
δ
ρ+ δ + sλ
1
b− stx
∂ (b− stx)
∂b ,
ρ∂U∂b =
ρ+ δ
ρ+ δ + sλ
1
b− stx
∂ (b− stx)
∂b .
Since ∂(b−stx)∂b > 0, we have ∂W∂b > 0 and ∂U∂b > 0.
1.4 Commuting cost
Effect on bx and x
Differentiating (A1) with respect to t, we obtain
∂bx
∂t = −
w (1− Γαγ)
t2
− wαγΓ
αγ−1
t
∂Γ
∂t ,
where
∂Γ
∂t = −
φ sλδ+sλ
[1 + φt (su+ e)]2 < 0.
Therefore, the sign of ∂x∂t is indeterminate.
Differentiating (16) with respect to t yields
∂x
∂t = −
1
st
∙∂Λ
∂t + sx
¸
,
where
∂Λ
∂t = −αγ
n
sw [1 + φt (su+ e)]−αγ−1 φ (su+ e) + (b− sw) [1 + φtsu]−αγ−1 φsu
o
< 0.
Therefore, the sign of ∂x∂t is indeterminate.
Effect on Ωw(x), Φw (x) and gw (x)
Differentiating (12) with respect to t, we obtain
∂Ωw(x)
∂t =
∂Ωw(0)
∂t
µ
w − tx
w
¶1/α
− tαwΩw(0)
µ
w − tx
w
¶1/α−1
,
where ∂Ωw(0)∂t > 0. Therefore, the sign of
∂Ωw(x)
∂t is indeterminate. The impact on Φw (x) and gw (x)
is then ambiguous.
Effect on Ωu(x), Φu (x) and gu(x)
Differentiating (12) with respect to t yields
∂Ωu(x)
∂t = −
1
α
"
(b− stx)− 1α (b− stx) 1α−1 sx+ (b− stx)
1
α
(b− stx) 1α+1
∂ (b− stx)
∂t
#
,
where ∂(b−stx)∂t < 0. Therefore, the sign of
∂Ωu(x)
∂t is indeterminate. The sign of Φu (x) and gu(x) is
indeterminate either.
Effect on W and U
Differentiating (A3) and (A4) with respect to t yields
ρ∂W∂t = −
α (ρ+ sλ)
ρ+ δ + sλ
1
Ωw(0)
∂Ωw(0)
∂t +
δ
ρ+ δ + sλ
1
b− stx
∂(b− stx)
∂t
ρ∂U∂t = −
αsλ
ρ+ δ + sλ
1
Ωw(0)
∂Ωw(0)
∂t +
ρ+ δ
ρ+ δ + sλ
1
b− stx
∂(b− stx)
∂t
Note that ∂Ωw(0)∂t > 0 and
∂(b−stx)
∂t < 0. Therefore, we have ∂W∂t < 0 and ∂U∂t < 0.
1.5 Job destruction
Effect on bx and x
Differentiating (A1) yields
∂bx
∂δ = −
wαγ
t
Γαγ−1∂Γ∂δ ,
where
∂Γ
∂δ = φt
sλ
(δ + sλ)2
1 + sφt sλδ+sλ + φt sδδ+sλ³
1 + φt s(δ+λ)δ+sλ
´2 > 0.
Therefore, we have ∂x∂δ < 0.
Differentiating (16) yields
∂x
∂δ = −
1
st
∂Λ
∂δ ,
where the sign of ∂Λ∂δ is indeterminate. Therefore, the sign of ∂x∂δ is indeteterminate either.
Effect on Ωw(x), Φw (x) and gw (x)
Differentiating (12) yields
∂Ωw(x)
∂δ =
µ
w − tx
w
¶1/α ∂Ω0(x)
∂δ
= −γ
µ
w − tx
w
¶1/α
[1 + φt (su+ e)]γ−1 φts(1− s)λ
(δ + sλ)2
< 0
for s ∈ (0, 1) . We then have ∂Φw(x)∂δ < 0 and ∂gw(x)∂δ < 0 for s ∈ (0, 1).
Effect on Ωu(x), Φu (x) and gu(x)
Differentiating (12) yields
∂Ωu(x)
∂δ =
1
α
µ
b− stx
b− stx
¶1/α−1 ∙
− b− stx
(b− stx)2
¸ ∂ (b− stx)
∂δ .
Since the sign of ∂(b−stx)∂δ is ambiguous, the sign of
∂Ωu(x)
∂δ is indeterminate. The sign of
∂Φu(x)
∂δ and
∂gu(x)
∂δ is indeterminate either.
Effect on W and U
The impact of δ on W and U is ambiguous.
1.6 Job acquisition
Effect on bx
Differentiating (A1), we get
∂bx
∂λ = −
w
t
αγΓαγ−1∂Γ∂λ ,
where
∂Γ
∂λ = −
φtsδ
(δ + sλ)2
1 + sφt³
1 + φt s(δ+λ)δ+sλ
´2 < 0.
We then have ∂x∂λ > 0.
Effect on Ωw(x), Φw (x) and gw (x)
Differentiating Ωw(x) with respect to λ yields
∂Ωw(x)
∂λ =
µ
w − tx
w
¶1/α ∂Ω0(x)
∂λ
= γ
µ
w − tx
w
¶1/α
[1 + φt (su+ e)]γ−1 φts (1− s) δ
(δ + sλ)2 .
Therefore, we have ∂Ωw(x)∂λ > 0 for s ∈ (0, 1) . Then, ∂Φw(x)∂λ > 0 and ∂gw(x)∂λ > 0.
Effect on x, Ωu(x), Φu(x), gu(x), W and U.
We find ambiguous impact of λ on x, Ωu(x), gu(x), W and U.
2 The integrated equilibrium
2.1 Search intensity
Effect on bx and x
Using (22), we get
(w − tx)Ωu(0)α = 1
s
½
b+ (sw − b)
µ
1 + φt(su+ e)
1 + φte
¶αγ¾
.
Inserting this equation into (19), we have
bx = b
st
∙
1−
µ
1 + φte
1 + φt(su+ e)
¶αγ¸
. (A5)
Plugging e = sλδ+sλ and u = δδ+sλ into (A5) and differentiating it with respect to s leads to
∂bx
∂s = −
b
s2t
"
1−
Ã
1 + φt sλδ+sλ
1 + φts(δ+λ)δ+sλ
!αγ#
+
Ã
1 + φt sλδ+sλ
1 + φts(δ+λ)δ+sλ
!αγ−1 αγφbδ2
s(δ+sλ)2h
1 + φts(δ+λ)δ+sλ
i2 ,
which implies that the sign of ∂x∂s is indeterminate.
Let
Υ ≡ 1
s
½
b
[1 + φt(su+ e)]αγ +
sw − b
(1 + φte)αγ
¾
.
Differentiating (22) with respect to s leads to
∂x
∂s = −
1
t
∂Υ
∂s ,
where
∂Υ
∂s = −
b
s2
½
b
[1 + φt(su+ e)]αγ +
sw − b
[1 + φte]αγ
¾
+
b
s
⎧
⎨
⎩
−αγφt δ(δ+λ)
(δ+sλ)2
[1 + φt(su+ e)]αγ+1 +
αγφt δλ
(δ+sλ)2
[1 + φte]αγ+1
⎫
⎬
⎭
+
−αγwφt δλ
(δ+sλ)2
[1 + φte]αγ+1
= − b
s2
½
b
[1 + φt(su+ e)]αγ +
sw − b
[1 + φte]αγ
¾
− b
s
αγφt δ(δ+λ)
(δ+sλ)2
[1 + φt(su+ e)]αγ+1 −
αγφt δλ
(δ+sλ)2
[1 + φte]αγ+1
sw − b
s
< 0.
Therefore, ∂x∂s is positive.
Effect on Ωw(x), Φw(x), and gw(x)
Differentiating (19) with respect to s, yields
∂Ωw(x)
∂s =
1
α
µ
w − tx
w − tx
¶1/α−1 ∙
− (w − tx)
(w − tx)2
∂ (w − tx)
∂s
¸
,
where ∂(w−tx)∂s = ∂Υ∂s < 0. Therefore, we have
∂Ωw(x)
∂s > 0. In turn,
∂Φw(x)
∂s and
∂gw(x)
∂s are positive.
Effect on Ωu(x), Φu(x), and gu(x)
Differentiating (19) with respect to s, we get
∂Ωu(x)
∂s =
∂Ω0(x)
∂s
µ
b− stx
b
¶1/α
− Ω0(x)α
µ
b− stx
b
¶1/α−1 tx
b
,
where the first term on the right-hand side is positive while the second term is negative. Therefore,
the sign of ∂Ωu(x)∂s is indeterminate. The impact on Φu(x) and gu(x) is also ambiguous.
Effect on W and U
Using (18), we get
ρW = B + δρ+ δ + sλ ln b−
αδ
ρ+ δ + sλ lnΩu(0) +
ρ+ sλ
ρ+ δ + sλ ln(w − tx), (A6)
ρU = B + ρ+ δρ+ δ + sλ ln b−
α (ρ+ δ)
ρ+ δ + sλ lnΩu(0) +
sλ
ρ+ δ + sλ ln(w − tx). (A7)
The sign of ∂W∂s and
∂U
∂s is indeterminate.
2.2 Wage
Effect on bx and x
From (A5), it can be seen that w has no impact on bx. Differentiating (22) yields
∂x
∂w =
1
t
µ
1− 1
(1 + φte)αγ
¶
Therefore, we have ∂x∂w > 0.
Effect on Ωw(x), Φw (x) and gw (x)
Differentiating (19) yields
∂Ωw(x)
∂w =
1
α
µ
w − tx
w − tx
¶1/α−1 1
w − tx
∙
1− ∂ (w − tx)∂w
w − tx
w − tx
¸
=
1
α
µ
w − tx
w − tx
¶1/α−1 1
w − tx
∙
1− 1
(1 + φte)αγ
w − tx
w − tx
¸
>
1
α
µ
w − tx
w − tx
¶1/α−1 1
w − tx
∙
1− 1
(1 + φte)αγ
w − tbx
w − tx
¸
for x > bx. Plugging (A5) into the above inequality, we obtain ∂Ωw(x)∂w > 0. Then, the sign of ∂Φw(x)∂w
and ∂gw(x)∂w is positive.
Effect on Ωu(x), Φu (x) and gu(x)
w has no impact on Ωu(x), Φu (x), and gu(x).
Effect on W and U
Differentiating (A6) and (A7) yields
ρ∂W∂w =
ρ+ sλ
ρ+ δ + sλ
1
w − tx
∂(w − tx)
∂w ,
ρ∂U∂w =
sλ
ρ+ δ + sλ
1
w − tx
∂(w − tx)
∂w ,
where ∂(w−tx)∂w > 0. Therefore, we have ∂W∂w > 0 and ∂U∂w > 0.
2.3 Unemployment benefit
Effect on bx and x
From (A5), we see that b has a positive impact on bx.
Differentiating (22) yields
∂x
∂b =
1
st
½
1
(1 + φte)αγ −
1
[1 + φt(su+ e)]αγ
¾
,
which implies ∂x∂b > 0.
Effect on Ωw(x), Φw (x) and gw (x)
Differentiating (19) yields
∂Ωw(x)
∂b = −
1
α
µ
w − tx
w − tx
¶1/α−1 w − tx
(w − tx)2
∂ (w − tx)
∂b ,
where
∂ (w − tx)
∂b =
1
s
½
1
[1 + φt(su+ e)]αγ −
1
(1 + φte)αγ
¾
< 0.
Therefore, ∂Ωw(x)∂b > 0. In turn, we have
∂Φw(x)
∂b > 0, and
∂gw(x)
∂b > 0.
Effect on Ωu(x), Φu (x) and gu(x)
Differentiating (19) with respect to b yields
∂Ωu(x)
∂b =
Ωu(0)
α
µ
b− stx
b
¶1/α−1 stx
b2
.
Therefore, we have ∂Ωu(x)∂b > 0. In turn, we have
∂Φu(x)
∂b > 0 and
∂gu(x)
∂b > 0.
Effect on W and U
Differentiating (A6) and (A7) with respect to b, we get
ρ∂W∂b =
δ
ρ+ δ + sλ
1
b
+
ρ+ sλ
ρ+ δ + sλ
1
w − tx
∂ (w − tx)
∂b ,
ρ∂U∂b =
ρ+ δ
ρ+ δ + sλ
1
b
+
sλ
ρ+ δ + sλ
1
w − tx
∂ (w − tx)
∂b .
Since ∂(w−tx)∂b < 0, we conclude that the sign of ∂W∂b and ∂U∂b is indeterminate.
2.4 Commuting cost
Effect on bx and x
Differentiating (A5) with respect to t leads to
∂bx
∂t = −
b
st2
∙
1−
µ
1 + φte
1 + φt(su+ e)
¶αγ¸
+
αγbφu
t [1 + φt(su+ e)]2
µ
1 + φte
1 + φt(su+ e)
¶αγ−1
.
Therefore, the sign of ∂x∂t is indeterminate.
Differentiating (22) with respect to t yields
∂x
∂t = −
x
t
− 1
t
∂Υ
∂t ,
where ∂Υ∂t < 0. Therefore, the sign of
∂x
∂t is indeterminate.
Effect on Ωw(x), Φw(x), and gw(x)
Differentiating (19) with respect to t yields
∂Ωw(x)
∂t = −
1
α
µ
w − tx
w − tx
¶1/α−1 1
w − tx
∙
x+
w − tx
w − tx
∂ (w − tx)
∂t
¸
.
Since ∂(w−tx)∂t < 0, the sign of Ωw(x) is indeterminate. In turn, the impact on Φw(x) and gw(x) is
indeterminate.
Effect on Ωu(x), Φu(x), and gu(x)
Differentiating (19) with respect to t yields
∂Ωu(x)
∂t =
∂Ω0(x)
∂t
µ
b− stx
b
¶1/α
− Ωu(0)α
µ
b− stx
b
¶1/α−1 sx
b
.
Therefore, the sign of ∂Ωu(x)∂t is indeterminate. In turn, the sign of
∂Φu(x)
∂t and
∂gu(x)
∂t is indeterminate.
Effect on W and U
Differentiating (A6) and (A7) with respect to t yields
ρ∂W∂t = −
αδ
ρ+ δ + sλ
1
Ωu(0)
∂Ωu(0)
∂t +
ρ+ sλ
ρ+ δ + sλ
1
w − tx
∂(w − tx)
∂t ,
ρ∂U∂t = −
α (ρ+ δ)
ρ+ δ + sλ
1
Ωu(0)
∂Ωu(0)
∂t +
sλ
ρ+ δ + sλ
1
w − tx
∂(w − tx)
∂t ,
where ∂Ωu(0)∂t > 0 and
∂(w−tx)
∂t < 0. Therefore, we have ∂W∂t < 0 and ∂U∂t < 0.
2.5 Job destruction
Differentiating (A5) with respect to δ yields
∂bx
∂δ =
Ã
1 + φt sλδ+sλ
1 + φt s(δ+λ)δ+sλ
!αγ−1 αγbφsλ
(δ + sλ)2
1 + φt³
1 + φts(δ+λ)δ+sλ
´2
> 0.
Differentiating (22) with respect to δ yields
∂Ωu(0)
∂δ < 0,
∂x
∂δ < 0.
Differentiating (19) with respect to δ and using the above results yields, we have ∂Ωw(x)∂δ < 0 and
∂Ωu(x)
∂δ < 0, which in turn imply
∂Φw(x)
∂δ < 0,
∂Φu(x)
∂δ < 0,
∂gw(x)
∂δ < 0, and
∂gu(x)
∂δ < 0.
Effect on W and U
The effects of δ on W and U are ambiguous.
2.6 Job asquisition
Plugging e = sλδ+sλ and u = δδ+sλ into (A5) and differentiating it with respect to λ yields
∂bx
∂λ = −
Ã
1 + φt sλδ+sλ
1 + φt s(δ+λ)δ+sλ
!−1 αγbφsδ
(δ + sλ)2
1 + φth
1 + φts(δ+λ)δ+sλ
i2
< 0.
Differentiating (22) yields
∂Ωu(0)
∂λ > 0,
∂x
∂λ > 0.
Differentiating (19) with respect to δ and using the above results, we obtain ∂Ωw(x)∂λ > 0, ∂Ωu(x)∂λ > 0,
which in turn imply ∂Φw(x)∂δ > 0,
∂Φu(x)
∂δ > 0,
∂gw(x)
∂λ > 0, and
∂gu(x)
∂λ > 0.
Effect on W and U
The effects of λ on W and U are ambiguous.
